As reported elsewhere on this site, one of key recommendations of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry in its phase 2 report is the creation of a new regulatory body to oversee the construction industry, including stanbdards, regulations and expertise, and an office of Chief Construction Adviser with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice to government on all matters affecting the construction industry.
In effect, the report is calling for what amounts to the abolition of not just self-certification and third-party self-certification but its replacement by state certification. There was a body that might once have been equipped to take on that task, the Building Research Establishment, but 鈥� according the Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report 鈥� since its privatisation in 1997, that body has fallen spectacularly from grace, so utterly corrupted by commercialisation that it can no longer be considered be considered worthy of any respect.
That, at least, is the picture that the report vividly paints.
Read this extract starting from page 217 of 聽Volume 2, Part 3 鈥� The testing and marketing of key products and judge for yourself.
The Building Research Establishment
鈥淏RE held a trusted position within the construction industry and more widely. Having begun life as a government agency it was privatised in 1997, after which it was engaged to advise the department from time to time on a broad range of matters relating to fire safety under contracts for research, investigations, reports and experimental work. Senior staff, including Dr Debbie Smith and Dr Sarah Colwell, were members of a range of committees working on fire safety standards at both European and national level, sometimes acting on behalf of the government. BRE was responsible for managing public consultations on, and drafting amendments to, Approved Document B and for advising working groups formed by the department on the introduction of new classifications such as Euroclass standards in 2002. Informally, BRE staff corresponded with the department, principally Mr Martin, on inquiries relating to fire safety received both by the department and by BRE itself. Their correspondence covered a range of matters, including the interpretation of parts of Approved Document B and international cladding fires.
鈥淏RE was widely recognised both nationally and internationally as a leader in fire safety. For many years before the fire at Grenfell Tower it was the only organisation in the UK capable of carrying out large-scale testing in accordance with BS 8414. BRE developed that test and published all three versions of BR 135, which set out the criteria against which data from tests carried out in accordance with BS 8414 should be assessed.
鈥淗owever, as our findings in earlier chapters demonstrate, much of the work carried out by BRE was marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour. In some cases we saw evidence of a desire to accommodate existing customers at the expense of maintaining the rigour of its processes. Despite its close association with the department over a long period of time and the opportunities that association provided for the informal exchange of views, BRE appears to have been reluctant to alert the department to developments of potential importance in the construction industry of which it became aware.
Testing in accordance with BS 8414
鈥淭here were weaknesses in the way BRE carried out tests in accordance with BS 8414. It did not identify carefully the materials delivered to the burn hall for individual tests, it did not ensure that they corresponded to the drawings of the system to be tested and did not ensure that the rig as constructed and tested accurately reflected the drawings that had been provided. The periodic checks that Dr Smith told us BRE staff were expected to make on systems under construction were vague and did not contain any clear direction in relation to frequency, timing or purpose. She told us that BRE staff in the burn hall were not trained to understand architectural drawings, so it is difficult to see why BRE required drawings to be provided or why its staff were expected to check systems under construction against them. Mr Clark, who managed the BRE burn hall between 2005 and 2015 and was responsible for compiling BRE鈥檚 standards and procedures for testing in accordance with BS 8414 in 2013, told us that he thought the drawings submitted by test sponsors were not intended to represent the system tested but the system as it was intended to be constructed as part of a building. He also told us that drawings had sometimes not been provided until after the test had taken place, as happened with the second test carried out for Celotex in May 2014. In that case Mr Clark prepared a draft report using drawings from the previous test in February 2014. As a result of those defects in the system, reports of tests did not always correctly describe the system tested.
鈥淏RE took the position, repeated in all test reports, that the configuration of the system to be tested was entirely a matter for the sponsor of the test, but that did not prevent it from carrying out proper checks to ensure that the system tested matched the description in the test reports and that the components were correctly identified and accurately recorded. We see no reason why BRE could not have kept comprehensive records of all materials delivered to the burn hall for every test, examined the drawings in advance and decided at what stage of construction checks should be made by BRE staff. Since the description of the system tested was fundamental to any subsequent report, close monitoring of the system in the course of construction was essential to ensure that the report was accurate. Nothing in BS EN ISO EIC 17025 prevented BRE from doing that. The absence of such arrangements represented a serious failure in its systems.
鈥淪hortcomings of that kind enabled Celotex to manipulate the testing process by introducing materials other than those described in the report. Moreover, although BRE was aware that commercial organisations were liable to manipulate their relationship with it to gain commercial advantage, it did not take adequate steps to ensure that those of its employees who came into direct contact with clients in the course of carrying out tests understood the need to maintain their distance and avoid undue familiarity. As a result, its employees were liable to be drawn into relationships with customers that undermined the independence, objectivity and rigour of their work.
鈥淚n 2004 Dr Colwell discussed testing with Kingspan in a way that went some way beyond providing general information about the process and amounted to giving advice on the best way to satisfy the criteria in BR 135. In December 2007, BRE staff offered unofficial comments and observations to Kingspan about the performance of K15 following the disastrous result of a test on a system of which it had formed part. In keeping with Kingspan鈥檚 strongly expressed wishes, BRE agreed to say no more in its report than that the system as a whole had not met the criteria in BR 135, despite having commented privately to Kingspan that the insulation had been fully involved and had continued to burn even after the flame source had been extinguished.
鈥淒espite his denials, we have found that Mr Clark advised Celotex on more than one occasion on ways in which it could improve its system for a second test after a failed test in February 2014. We have also found that he was aware of the inclusion of additional magnesium oxide boards during the second Celotex test that were not referred to in the test report or the classification report. We also saw for ourselves a recording of Mr Clark engaging in discussions with Mr Meredith during the test of a system incorporating Kingspan K15 in March 2014 in the course of which he gave advice on the performance of the system and how to argue about what the results showed.
鈥淭he unprofessional behaviour of some of BRE鈥檚 staff was in part the result of a failure to provide them with adequate training in the performance of their responsibilities. We have been critical of Mr Clark for advising Celotex on ways in which it might improve its system following the test in February 2014, for failing to draw attention to the use by Celotex of magnesium oxide boards in the system tested in May 2014 and for giving advice to Kingspan during the test conducted for it in March 2014. However, he had received no training from BRE of any kind on what was required by way of independence and impartiality, nor had he had any discussion at any time with any of his managers about what might constitute impermissible advice and consultancy services. There was no mandatory training or centralised record of training within BRE and its staff were responsible for their own training records. Quite simply, Mr Clark did not know where to draw the line and he crossed it on various occasions. The failure to provide training of that kind represents a failure to establish proper management systems.
Commercial interests
鈥淲hen invited to a meeting of the CWCT [Centre for Window and Cladding Technology] Fire Group in July 2014 to discuss fire and facades, including the use of combustible insulation on high-rise residential buildings, Dr Smith鈥檚 alarm at what she saw as a potential threat to BRE鈥檚 pre-eminent position as an adviser on such matters betrayed a desire to put BRE鈥檚 status in the industry and commercial position ahead of considerations of public safety.
Investigation of Real Fires project
鈥淲e recognise that BRE鈥檚 fire investigations for the department were constrained by limited resources and time and also by the restrictive terms of its contracts, particularly after 2012. Nonetheless, the investigations it carried out for the department were characterised by a lack of analysis and were at best superficial. Most reports revealed very little that would enable one to discern patterns or trends or even understand what had caused or contributed to any particular fire. The reports repeatedly confirmed the overall effectiveness of the regulations and guidance without any proper basis for that conclusion. As a result they gave false comfort to the department for many years and served only to increase the danger that important matters would be missed. BRE鈥檚 reports into the major fires at Knowsley Heights (1991), Garnock Court (1999) and The Edge (2005) and its preliminary report into the fire at Lakanal House (2009) were far from comprehensive and in each case failed to identify or assess important contributory factors. Most significantly, although each of those fires was often referred to as providing important lessons for the future, no one at BRE was able to describe what those lessons actually were.
Relationship with the government
鈥淭he status of BRE, its origins and historical links with the department, as well as the fact that for many years Brian Martin, while employed by BRE, had been seconded to the department might reasonably have been expected to foster a relationship under which BRE would alert the department to significant developments in matters affecting the safety of life that might call for amendments to the Building Regulations or statutory guidance. However, the relationship did not work in that way, to the detriment of the department and the public at large. Although BRE recognised from as early as 1991 following the fire at Knowsley Heights that small-scale testing, in particular of the kind that provided the basis for national Class 0, was inadequate to enable a proper assessment to be made of the reaction of external cladding systems to fire, we found nothing to indicate that BRE had drawn that to the department鈥檚 attention, formally or informally.
鈥淪imilarly, following its large-scale test of a system incorporating aluminium composite panels with polyethylene cores in 2001 under contract cc1924, BRE failed to draw the department鈥檚 attention in clear terms, either in its report or informally, to the way in which the material had behaved and the dangers it presented, particularly if used on high-rise buildings. The department did not have access to its own scientific advice on matters affecting fire safety, as we think BRE must have been aware, and so depended to a significant extent on information of the kind that BRE was able to provide. The failure of that relationship represented a significant gap in the arrangements intended to protect the safety of the public.
The quality of BRE鈥檚 work
鈥淏RE was engaged regularly by the department to carry out research and provide reports, but the quality of the work it produced was in many cases poor. For example, reports produced under the cc1924 project conflated Class 0 and limited combustibility when describing the regulatory requirements and guidance. 聽That was a fundamental error that was repeated by BRE when reporting on the fire at Lakanal House and in the work done for the department by the BRE on external fire spread in 2015. That particular piece of work, which involved experimental testing and a background research paper, was seriously inadequate. It was deeply flawed in almost every respect, lacked any scientific value and purported to draw positive conclusions about the effectiveness of the regulations and guidance that could not sensibly have been reached on the basis of the work that had been carried out.鈥�
The BRE responds
海角社区app invited the BRE to respond. Here is what it said: 鈥淏RE welcomes the publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry鈥檚 report and fully supports the process of ensuring that a tragedy such as this can never happen again. We have nothing but the deepest sympathy for the friends and families of those who lost their lives, and all those whose lives were changed by the fire.
鈥淲e will be reviewing the report and its recommendations and will continue to work constructively with government to ensure the new building safety and testing regime delivers on the findings of the Inquiry鈥檚 report and is fit for purpose.鈥�
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